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Abstract
Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction has received renewed interest in recent 
years. Here we discuss its role in arguments about the relevance of 
developmental to evolutionary biology. We show that two recent critiques of the 
proximate-ultimate distinction fail to explain why developmental processes in 
particular should be of interest to evolutionary biologists. We trace these failures 
to a common problem: both critiques take the proximate-ultimate distinction to 
neglect specific causal interactions in nature. We argue that this is implausible, 
and that the distinction should instead be understood in the context of 
explanatory abstractions in complete causal models of evolutionary change. 
Once the debate is reframed in this way, the proximate-ultimate distinction’s role 
in arguments against the theoretical significance of evo-devo is seen to rely on a 
generally implicit premise: that the variation produced by development is 
abundant, small and undirected. We show that a “lean version” of the proximate-
ultimate distinction can be maintained even when this isotropy assumption does 
not hold. Finally, we connect these considerations to biological practice. We show 
that the investigation of developmental constraints in evolutionary transitions has 
long relied on a methodology which foregrounds the explanatory role of 
developmental processes. It is, however, entirely compatible with the lean 
version of the proximate-ultimate distinction. 
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1.!Introduction
Ernst Mayr’s proximate-ultimate-distinction  (Mayr 1961) has recently received renewed 
interest in the literature, especially in this journal. Biologists and philosophers of biology 
have been debating how the distinction (here abbreviated as PUD) should be 
understood, what conceptual work it does, and how it can illuminate debates about 
issues such as niche construction and evolutionary developmental biology  (Laland et al 
2011; Laland et al 2012; Haig 2013; Dickins, & Barton 2012; Calcott 2013; Gardner 
2013). In the context of evolutionary developmental biology, the PUD has long been 
especially controversial because of its use – by Mayr himself – as an argument against 
the relevance of development to evolution  (Mayr 1984; Amundson 2005, especially 
chapters 10 and 11).
In the present paper, we argue that in order to fully articulate the PUD and to handle its 
problems, it is necessary to distinguish between causal irrelevance and explanatory 
abstraction. We will begin by introducing the PUD and some recent criticisms of it 
(section 2). Where previous authors have claimed that the PUD is limited because it 
omits certain types of biological causation, we argue that a reframing of the debate is 
required (section 3). The PUD should be understood not in terms of the omission of 
causes, but in terms of appropriate explanatory abstractions in complete causal models 
of evolutionary change. We will show that this perspective allows us both to recover a 
useful “lean version” of the PUD and to embrace recent critiques. Finally, we will show 
how our account connects to actual scientific practice by discussing two studies of 
developmental constraints in evolutionary processes (section 4): one from recent, 
molecular evo-devo and one from an earlier, morphological approach.
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2.!The proximate-ultimate distinction and its discontents
2.1 The PUD and evolutionary developmental biology
Mayr 1961 argued that biology, despite its seeming unity, is made up of at least two 
fields that differ in their choice of, and approach to, research problems. On the one 
hand, Mayr recognizes a discipline of functional biology, of which he writes:
The functional biologist is vitally concerned with the operation and 
interaction of structural elements, from molecules up to organs and whole 
individuals. His ever-repeated question is ‘How?’. (p. 1502)
He contrasts this with the interests of the evolutionary biologist:
His basic question is ‘Why?’. […] To find the causes for the existing 
characteristics, and particularly adaptations, of organisms is the main 
preoccupation of the evolutionary biologist. (p. 1502)
Mayr could be read as distinguishing between “how” and “why” questions; between 
causes acting in the past and causes acting in the present; between different types of 
causes; or between scientific disciplines.
The distinction between past and present causes appears to be favored by several 
authors  (Amundson 2005; Haig 2013; Hochman 2012). However, it seems to us that 
Mayr’s original text does not support this interpretation. Mayr begins by recognizing two 
distinct subdisciplines: Functional biology is concerned with “the operation and 
interaction of structural elements” (what we might call biological mechanisms in the 
sense of Machamer et al 2000), whereas evolutionary biology studies “the causes for 
the existing characteristics”, “the reasons for this diversity [of the organic world] as well 
as the pathway by which it has been achieved” or “the forces that bring about changes 
in faunas and floras” (all of these quotes appear in quick succession on p. 1502, the 
emphases are ours). Mayr then assigns the label “proximate” to the former and 
“ultimate” to the latter. He specifies the ultimate causes further:
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These are causes that have a history and that have been incorporated into 
the system through many thousands of generations of natural selection. 
(p. 1503)
Together with the references to “causes”, “reasons” and “forces” of change or existing 
characteristics, this quotation indicates that Mayr is distinguishing not between past and 
present causes, but between different types of causes or processes. We can read 
ultimate causes as evolutionary processes, among which Mayr regards natural selection 
as the most important. Mayr’s chosen illustration is the seasonal migration of birds (p. 
1502–1503), where we can ask either what biological mechanisms regulate bird 
migration or what evolutionary processes explains that these mechanisms exist.
This interpretation is also compatible with a further reformulation of the distinction to 
which Mayr kept returning throughout his career: An informational metaphor according 
to which functional biology deals with “all aspects of the decoding of the programmed 
information contained in the DNA code of the fertilized zygote” while evolutionary 
biology is interested in “the history of these codes of information and in the laws that 
control changes of these codes from generation to generation” (p. 1502). A schematic 
representation of the “informational version” of the PUD is given in figure 1.
Adopting this reading of Mayr’s original paper gives typical answers to the other 
readings as well, and this explains in part why it has been difficult to assign an 
unambiguous original intention to Mayr. Evolutionary explanations of organismic traits 
typically answer questions that can be naturally phrased as “why”-questions (but of 
course we can ask: “how did the present mechanisms of bird migration evolve?”); they 
typically refer to selection acting in the past (although selection does, of course, act in 
the present); and they are typically investigated by evolutionary biology. 
In the context of the 1961 paper, Mayr used the PUD to argue for the continued 
relevance of organismic biology in the face of molecular approaches  (Beatty 1994). It is 
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only in the 1980s that Mayr began to deploy the distinction against evolutionary 
developmental biology:
The suggestion that it is the task of the Darwinians to explain development 
[…] makes it evident that Ho and Saunders [critics of the Modern 
Synthesis] are unaware of the important difference between proximate 
and ultimate causations […]. Expressed in modern terminology, ultimate 
causations (largely natural selection) are those involved in the assembling 
of new genetic programmes, and proximate causations those that deal 
with the decoding of the genetic programme during ontogeny and 
subsequent life.  (Mayr 1984, p. 1262)
The PUD is claimed to give rise to an explanatory asymmetry: Evolutionary causes (in 
the horizontal arrows) explain how the genetic programs underlying functional causes 
(in the vertical arrows) have changed across generations. But there is no comparable 
reverse relationship – functional causes are of no relevance to evolutionary causes. 
This view is echoed by the geneticist Bruce Wallace (a former student of Thedosius 
Dobzhansky), who wrote forcefully:
Evolutionary geneticists have the responsibility for explaining the origins 
and subsequent fates of the genetic programs which determine 
developmental programs; embryologists, on the contrary, need not explain 
how somatic development might affect the evolution of these 
developmental programs. Except for achieving success in reproduction, 
they do not.  (Wallace 1986, p. 150)
The PUD thus provides the basis for an argument for the irrelevance of development to 
evolutionary explanations.
2.2. The PUD’s critics
There exists an ongoing debate about whether a distinction between proximate and 
ultimate causes should be drawn, and if so, how to draw it. Ariew  (2003) has argued 
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that the proper distinction is one between individual-level causal and population-level 
statistical explanations. Haig  (2013) has argued that the distinctions between past and 
present causes and between mechanisms and adaptive rationale get conflated, and that 
the PUD should be abandoned in favor of a distinction between “how come?” and “what 
for?” questions. Similarly, Gardner  (2013) holds that the proper “ultimate” question 
concerns the adaptive rationale of organism design. Calcott  (2013) has suggested the 
more pluralistic view that Mayr’s PUD captures only one contrast among many which 
can be used to ask interesting biological questions.
In the context of evolutionary developmental biology, the most salient critiques are by 
Amundson  (2005) and Laland et al. (2011; 2012).
Since natural selection invariably operates on developmental processes, Amundson 
2005 argues that any account of an evolutionary transition is causally incomplete so 
long as it does not include the relevant developmental processes. Following Horder, he 
proposes a “causal completeness principle” or CCP:
In order to achieve a modification in adult form, evolution must modify the 
embryological processes responsible for that form. Therefore an 
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Figure 1. A schematic view of the “informational” version of Mayr’s proximate-ultimate-distinction. G1 to 
G4 indicate population gene pools at time intervals 1 to 4 (arbitrary units). P1 to P4 indicate population 
phenotypes at the same time intervals. Mayr’s proximate causes (vertical) mediate between genotypes 
and phenotypes; in contrast, ultimate causes (horizontal) are responsible for change from one 
population gene pool to the next over time.
understanding of evolution requires an understanding of development. (p. 
176)
Gene pools of one generation only become gene pools of the next generation via 
phenotypes. The PUD implies a historically continuous lineage of gene pools with 
phenotypic offshoots (as shown in Figure 1) when, in fact, gene pools and phenotypes 
must be seen as occurring in series. On this view, causes cannot be either proximate or 
ultimate; they can only be more or less proximate and more or less ultimate (and this 
holds both on the “past/present” and the “types of causes” readings of the PUD). 
Amundson’s CCP critique is also accepted by Alan Love  (2006, p. 322), who argues 
that a version of the CCP constitutes part of the evo-devo synthesis’s criteria for 
explanatory adequacy. Figure 2 summarizes the “causal completeness” critique.
Problematically, however, Amundson’s critique fails to offer a reason why developmental 
processes in particular should be of interest to evolutionary biology. On the criterion of 
causal completeness, we might also ask for a biochemical-evolutionary synthesis (since 
biochemistry is both continuously operating in organisms and changed by selection) or 
indeed a physiological-evolutionary synthesis. Some might argue that these are indeed 
needed, but we think it is possible to give good reasons why development in particular 
is of interest to evolutionists.
Moreover, Amundson’s critique is implausibly uncharitable towards Mayr’s views. Mayr 
argued vehemently that selection acts on phenotypes and not on genotypes  (Mayr 
1997). That development was thus part of the complete causal story of any evolutionary 
explanation could not plausibly have been doubted by him or his contemporaries. Even 
in Mayr’s chosen illustration of the PUD – bird migration – the role of development in a 
causally complete account is obvious. Thus, we find it implausible to think that Mayr did 
not believe development to be part of the complete causal story. It is more promising to 
argue with Love  (2006, cited above) that Mayr adhered to different criteria of 
explanatory adequacy which did not include causal completeness. But this also seems 
to us an extraordinary assumption which would require extraordinary documentation.
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More promising at first sight is the critique by Laland et al.  (2011; 2012), who argue that 
the PUD ignores certain prevalent types of reciprocal causation:
In reciprocal processes, ultimate explanations must include an account of 
the sources of selection (as these are modified by the evolutionary 
process) as well as the causes of the phenotypes subject to selection.  
(Laland et al 2011, p. 1512)
The authors’ paradigmatic case is niche construction  (Odling-Smee et al 2003), where 
selection creates organisms which alter their environment and thus, in turn, alter 
selection pressures. Laland et al. regard Mayr’s view as one of linear causation, where 
a series of genotypes are successively adapted to static selection pressures. In niche 
construction, however, there is a phenotype-mediated alteration of the selective 
environment, and thus reciprocal causation.
According to Laland et al., the same line of argument shows why the PUD is 
inapplicable in the case of evo-devo. They use the example of phenotypic plasticity 
permitting an adaptive response which is then only secondarily genetically stabilized  
(West-Eberhard 2003; Minelli 2003). The idea here is that plastic phenotypes can 
“bridge” evolutionary transitions by permitting phenotypic adaptations before any 
genetic adaptations take place. Hence, the plastic phenotype effectively changes the 
selection pressures and makes it possible for phenotype-stabilizing genes to be 
selected. In the absence of the phenotypic adaptation, these same genes might never 
have been selectively advantageous. Again, then, we have the reciprocity of causation 
which Laland et al. diagnose as lacking in the classical conception of the PUD: selection 
creates phenotype, phenotype changes selection pressures.
However, the criterion of reciprocal causation fails to pick out all the cases of interest, 
and only those. On the one hand, reciprocal causation is again too inclusive since it is 
ever present. Most phenotypes will be plastic to at least some degree, and so if we take 
the criterion of reciprocal causation seriously, we would conclude that the PUD never 
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applies. On the other hand, reciprocal causation is not sufficiently inclusive: There are 
phenomena that are of great theoretical interest to developmental evolutionists but that 
are not neatly captured as instances of reciprocal causation. Take for example 
developmental drive  (Arthur 2001), where the availability of developmental variants co-
determines the direction of evolution. It is not at all obvious how this is a case of 
reciprocal causation in the sense of Laland et al., but it is definitely a phenomenon of 
theoretical interest to evo-devo, at least potentially necessitating the inclusion of 
developmental causes in evolutionary explanations. On the criterion of reciprocal 
causation, however, cases of developmental drive would slip through our net.
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Figure 2. The “causal completeness principle” after Amundson (2005) as a critique of the claim that the 
proximate-ultimate distinction justifies the exclusion of developmental causes from evolutionary 
explanations. The CCP stresses that genotypes of one generation (such as G1) become genotypes of 
the next generation (G2) only via phenotypes (P1). Therefore, evolutionary causes are not more 
“ultimate” than developmental causes on a “past/present” reading of the proximate-ultimate distinction: A 
cause occurring in the ontogeny of the second generation (G2 to P2, A) is more “ultimate” in a temporal 
sense than one of Mayr’s ultimate causes (e.g., selection) acting on the population between generations 
3 and 4 (P3 to G4, B). Moreover, the phenotypic variation on which selection acts is produced by 
development, and so development cannot be exclusively assigned to the “proximate” domain on a “types 
of causes” reading of the proximate-ultimate distinction. See text for details.
3.!Towards a better conception of the proximate-ultimate distinction: abstraction 
in complete causal models of evolutionary change
Our thesis, which we will defend below, is that it is a mistake to think about the PUD in 
terms of allegedly omitted biological causes. It is much more fruitful to think in terms of 
abstraction in causal explanations: The issue is not whether certain types of causation 
(e.g. between genotype and phenotype, or between phenotype and selective 
environment) exist, but whether these causal paths carry much weight in the 
explanations we give. We should not ask: Is there causation between genotype and 
phenotype? Of course there is. Or: Is there causation between phenotype and 
environment? Again, of course there is. We should ask instead what motivates the 
foregrounding or backgrounding of some parts of a complete causal account of any 
given evolutionary transition. The key concern is not causal relevance but explanatory 
salience.
Two types of abstractions from a causally complete account are possible in principle. 
First, we may de-emphasize “horizontal” factors, that is, parts of a cluster of causes 
which are jointly sufficient for bringing about an effect. Thus, when we explain why a 
shed burned down, we will place more emphasis on the arsonist’s match than on the 
presence of oxygen in the air, even though both factors are part of a causally complete 
account. Second, we may de-emphasize “vertical” factors, that is, parts of a causal 
chain leading from cause to effect. Consider the explanation of scurvy as the effect of 
vitamin C deficiency: Depending on circumstances, the explanations we give will 
emphasize that vitamin C deficiency causes scurvy while neglecting a precise account 
of the intervening mechanism by which vitamin C is involved in collagen synthesis. 
Neither horizontal nor vertical abstraction is intended as a statement about causal 
irrelevance: only explanatory insignificance is implied.
Both horizontal and vertical abstraction can be motivated by objective or pragmatic 
reasons. That the arsonist’s match has more explanatory salience than oxygen is partly 
due to the fact that oxygen is present around all our sheds, and so only the arsonist’s 
match answers the contrastive question of why one shed rather than another burned 
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down. In a legal context, by contrast, we may place pragmatic emphasis on the 
arsonist’s match because it involves human agency.
How does the perspective of abstractions in complete causal models of evolutionary 
change help in the debate about the proximate-ultimate distinction? We have seen that 
Mayr’s “informational” version of the PUD has been taken to imply an explanatory 
asymmetry: evolutionary processes explain developmental mechanisms, but 
developmental mechanisms do not explain evolutionary processes. However, In the 
context of the Amundson critique, we have also seen that Mayr cannot plausibly have 
meant to imply that developmental causes are absent in evolutionary processes – after 
all, Mayr insisted that the phenotype and not the genotype is the object of selection. 
Thus, simply to ask for causal completeness would be to talk at cross-purposes with 
Mayr.
The solution is to recognize that Mayr considered natural selection to be the main force 
in evolutionary explanations. Thus, he foregrounded selection and abstracted 
development, although both are uncontroversially part of a complete causal account of 
evolutionary transitions. This foregrounding of selection is in line with Mayr’s known 
theoretical commitments and the general “hardening” of the modern synthesis at the 
time  (Gould 1983). The foregrounding of selection is also made explicit in Mayr’s 1984 
use of the PUD against evolutionary developmental biology, where he equates ultimate 
causes with natural selection clearly by speaking of “ultimate causations (largely natural 
selection)”  (Mayr 1984, p. 1262).
The key question, then, is this: Under what circumstances can selection be taken to be 
the main explanatory force in evolutionary explanations? The conceptual answer to this 
is as old as the Origin of Species  (1859), where Darwin writes:
If selection consisted merely in separating some very distinct variety, and 
breeding from it, the principle would be so obvious as hardly to be worth 
notice; but its importance consists in the great effect produced by the 
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accumulation in one direction, during successive generations, of 
differences absolutely inappreciable by an uneducated eye […]. (p. 32)
Darwin recognizes that the explanatory force of natural selection depends on the 
character of the variation upon which it acts. Gould  (2002, p. 144–146) made this more 
precise, noting that selection is maximally powerful if it acts on abundant, small and 
undirected variation. He called this “isotropic” variation. The underlying insight is that if 
variation is “fine grained” in the sense discussed, then selection explains every step in 
the cumulative change of the system. Even though the variation still has developmental 
causes, these do not explain much since only those variations that confer a fitness 
advantage will survive the selective sieve. The more “non-isotropic” or coarse grained 
variation is, by contrast, the more will we need to ask which developmental processes 
impart structure to it.
The idea that development carries no force in evolutionary explanations rests on the 
assumption of variational isotropy. In arguing for an explanatory asymmetry between 
development and evolution, Mayr, Wallace and others implicitly commit to this 
assumption.
Thus, two issues have become conflated. The first issue is the PUD, which does not 
necessarily imply an explanatory asymmetry between evolution and development. We 
think a “lean version” of the PUD should be maintained, since it separates research 
agendas (Mayr’s Fragestellungen) that are indeed concerned with different aspects of 
causation in nature: Proximate questions about biological mechanisms are different 
from ultimate questions about the evolutionary processes that have produced these 
same mechanisms. Proximate and ultimate causes answer different contrastive 
questions. The proximate questions asks why this bird flies south in contrast to another, 
otherwise identical bird that lacks the same neural mechanism. In contrast, the ultimate 
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question asks why these birds fly south in contrast to another population of birds with a 
different history of natural selection  (Knell, & Weber 2009, p. 92ff; Ariew 2003).1
The second issue is the claim that developmental mechanisms carry no force in 
evolutionary explanations. This is only true in cases where variation is isotropic sensu 
Gould, and this empirical assumption is independent of the lean version of the PUD. On 
the assumption of isotropic variation, developmental mechanisms are indeed nothing 
but gory mechanistic detail in evolutionary explanations. When variation is not isotropic, 
however, developmental causes do carry explanatory force in evolutionary transitions – 
and our lean version of the PUD is entirely compatible with this possibility. The task of 
proponents of the evo-devo approach has always been to argue not against the PUD, 
but against the generality of the isotropy assumption – to argue that some evolutionary 
explanations require us to foreground developmental mechanisms.2 It is not a new idea 
that a shift of explanatory focus is key to understanding the evo-devo synthesis: Günter 
Wagner has argued along these lines  (Wagner 2000; Wagner 2001; Wagner, & Larsson 
2003), as has Ingo Brigandt  (2010, p. 302).
With this conceptual background in place, we can now return to the criticisms and 
examples discussed so far. Consider Laland et al.’s example of developmental plasticity 
allowing evolutionary transitions. West-Eberhard’s instructive example of this is a two-
legged goat  (West-Eberhard 2005). The goat was born with paralyzed front legs and 
had to use its hind legs to hop around. After its death, a dissection revealed a number of 
phenotypic accommodations to two-legged gait – accommodations which in 
evolutionary studies we might be tempted to assume to be produced by the cumulation 
of small, individually advantageous variations. In light of the foregoing discussion, 
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1 It has recently been suggested by several authors that ultimate questions should be restricted to issues 
of adaptive rationale or “what for?”  (Haig 2013; Gardner 2013). To some extent, this is a dispute about 
preferred linguistic usage. However, in the spirit of Gould and Lewontin  (1979) we prefer to include all 
evolutionary processes in the ultimate category. This includes selection, drift, developmental constraints, 
and more. Which of these processes are the most relevant should then be investigated as an empirical 
matter on a case by case basis.
2 Similar arguments could be made for other processes that have an effect on variational isotropy, such 
as variation in mutation rates  (Hodgkinson, & Eyre-Walker 2011).
however, we can recognize this clearly as a case where variation is non-isotropic: 
instead of abundant, small and undirected, the phenotypic accommodation is large and 
adaptive. Had this been the first stage of an evolutionary transition toward two-legged 
gait in goats (or in any other vertebrate), an adequate evolutionary explanation would 
have needed to foreground the developmental processes which permitted this 
accommodation.
Now consider Laland et al.’s example of niche construction. It is certainly not the case 
that in niche construction organisms causally interact with their environment whereas in 
other cases of evolution they do not. Reciprocity of causation between selection and the 
environment always exists. Rather, the argument is that in some cases the organism will 
change its environment such that its further evolutionary trajectory is markedly different 
from what it would have been if the environment had stayed static. In these cases, then, 
the impact of the organism on the environment has explanatory force, which motivates 
the foregrounding of that part of the complete causal story. However, in many cases of 
niche construction it may be perfectly appropriate to background developmental causes, 
if the variation available to selection is isotropic.
Finally, consider developmental drive, where the availability of variations co-determines 
the trajectory of evolutionary change. On the criterion of reciprocal causation, we would 
not recognize that such cases are of particular interest to developmental evolutionists. 
However, the difficulty disappears if we recognize the role of the isotropy assumption. In 
cases of developmental drive, variation is clearly not isotropic, and thus the 
developmental mechanisms responsible for the creation of variation need to be 
foregrounded if we are to understand the trajectory of evolution. Meanwhile, however, 
cases of developmental drive will generally allow us to background the interaction of the 
phenotype with the environment, unless significant niche construction happens in the 
same evolutionary episode.
In summary, we argue that the critiques of “causal completeness” and “reciprocal 
causation” fail because they do not reliably pick out those aspects of individual 
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evolutionary episodes which are of interest to developmental evolutionists or experts in 
niche construction. Instead, the proper framing of the question concerns explanatory 
abstractions in causal models: Under what circumstances is it appropriate for 
explanatory purposes to foreground or background certain aspects of the complete 
causal account of any given evolutionary transition? Ernst Mayr abstracted from 
developmental causes because he assumed isotropy of variation. In cases where this 
assumption is not warranted, however, developmental causes carry explanatory force 
and must be included. In other cases, interactions between the phenotype and the 
environment may carry particular explanatory force. This approach permits us a 
charitable reading of Mayr, whose focus on development-less natural selection can be 
seen as a special case where variation is isotropic. In the half-century since Mayr’s 
discussion of the proximate-ultimate distinction, it has become apparent that the 
isotropy assumption does not hold generally. Thus, developmental causes can carry 
explanatory force in both the proximate and the ultimate domain. Nevertheless, we have 
argued that we should maintain a lean version of the proximate-ultimate distinction: 
between different types of contrastive questions. 
4.!Case studies: Digital reduction in amphibians and the origin of pigment 
patterns in Drosophila
In the preceding section, we accepted a lean version of the PUD while suggesting a 
framework in which we can ask which causal factors carry particular explanatory weight 
in different evolutionary transitions. We take it as given that development, plasticity and 
niche construction are causally relevant to a greater or lesser degree in practically all 
evolutionary transitions. However, when any of these processes carry particular 
explanatory force, they need to be foregrounded in evolutionary explanations. 
Otherwise, they can be safely abstracted. This allows us to speak of some evolutionary 
transitions as if development or plasticity did not play a role, because variation is 
isotropic; or as if niche construction did not play a role, because the environment 
remains stable in relevant respects.
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We will now connect this philosophical approach with actual scientific practice by 
considering two case studies where scientists argue by foregrounding parts of a 
complete causal account of evolutionary transitions. Both cases concern developmental 
constraints in evolutionary transitions, one of the classical theoretical concerns of evo-
devo  (Maynard-Smith et al 1985).3
In the philosophical literature, the opinion is prevalent that the investigation of 
constraints or drive requires optimality analyses of the trait under selection. Elliott Sober 
in his “Six Sayings About Adaptationism”  (Sober 1998), for example, discusses the 
following saying:
Adaptationist thinking is an indispensable research tool. The only way to 
find out whether an organism is imperfectly adapted is to describe what it 
would be like if it were perfectly adapted. (p. 83)
Sober adds that this “is exactly right”. However, we will argue that Sober’s view does not 
do justice to the scientific practice of developmental evolutionists. In order to show that 
a trait was not formed by the cumulation of isotropic variation (abundant, small and 
undirected), it is often sufficient to show that the fine structure of the actual trait reflects 
developmental mechanisms. In other words, the developmental processes of the 
complete causal model of an evolutionary transition get foregrounded to show their role 
in determining actual structures. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility that 
one of the limited number of variants available to selection just so happens also to be 
functionally optimal as if it had been cumulatively selected from isotropic variation. 
However, it would then be up to the adaptationist to show that this coincidence has 
actually occurred, and so the burden of proof is shifted  (Pigliucci, & Boudry 2013).
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3 Gould  (1989) argued valiantly that “constraint” should be understood not only in the negative sense of 
limiting the power of selection, but also in the positive sense of channeling evolutionary transitions in 
particular adaptive directions. It seems that this usage has not been widely adopted; the more recent term 
“developmental drive”  (Arthur 2001) appears to have been received more favorably for the positive case. 
Both constraints and drive, however, have the same conceptual foundation: If the variation available to 
selection is strongly structured by developmental mechanisms, then evolutionary transitions will need to 
be explained by asking both which variants were selectively advantageous and which variants were 
produced in the first place.
Our first example is from work carried out by Pere Alberch, who wrote on both 
conceptual and methodological aspects of the problem of integrating evolution and 
development in the 1980s (theory in Alberch 1982, empirical results in Alberch, & Gale 
1985). These studies have become part of textbook canon within the field of 
evolutionary biology  (Futuyma 1998, p. 672). They have also received attention from 
philosophers of evo-devo  (Amundson 1994), but there has been a dearth of 
consideration of the methodology by which Alberch argues for developmental 
constraints.
Alberch’s original papers reveal that he clearly appreciated the contrast between causal 
completeness and explanatory adequacy, even though he did not use these exact 
terms. Alberch and Gale begin their major 1985 paper by pointing out that the causal 
role of development in evolutionary processes is generally undisputed:
That development, as the link between the genotype (level of variation) 
and the phenotype (level of selection), plays a role in structuring 
evolutionary patterns is not a point of contention. Instead, the basic issue 
is to show what additional insight could be gained by incorporating 
development into the current evolutionary scheme. (p. 8)
The language employed in this passage is somewhat infelicitous. Writing of 
development’s “role in structuring evolutionary patterns” makes it appear as though 
development had an accepted role to play in actually directing the course of evolution 
(perhaps along with natural selection). The context indicates, however, that the 
uncontested fact expressed by the phrase “the link between the genotype … and the 
phenotype” is merely meant to be that development causally connects the genotype 
(which varies) and the phenotype (which is selected upon). This interpretation of the 
passage is in line with Alberch’s earlier conceptual work  (Alberch 1982).
To rephrase, Alberch and Gale point out that development is uncontroversially among 
the causal links between genotype and phenotype, but that it is not clear whether 
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development has any role to play in setting the path of evolutionary change, and if it 
does, how to demonstrate such a role. Alberch and Gale regard their paper mainly as a 
methodological contribution showing how this problem could be approached. To put it in 
our terminology, they set out to construct a methodology for demonstrating that 
developmental factors need to be foregrounded in specific explanations of evolutionary 
change.
The empirical study presented by Alberch and Gale consists of comparisons within and 
among two orders of amphibians: plethodontid salamanders and anuran frogs. The trait 
of interest is loss of phalanges in the extremities. In short, the authors are able to show 
that the pattern of phalangeal loss is similar in species belonging to the same order, but 
different among orders. They further show that different morphologies within the same 
order can be reproduced experimentally by varying a single developmental parameter: 
size (=number of cells) in the limb bud, which can be manipulated by the (reversible) 
application of colchicine to the developing limb bud. For example, treatment of the limb 
bud of the salamander Ambystoma mexicanum with colchicine results in the loss of 
various phalanges in such a way as to mimic the (normal) morphology of the related 
species Hemidactylium scutatum (see Figure 3).
Alberch presented a similar argument in another publication that same year, in which he 
asked why St. Bernards often have an extra digit on their hind limb (polydactyly) and 
poodles never do  (Alberch 1985). In the past, selective hypotheses had been 
proposed, such as the notion that an extra digit might impart some type of locomotory 
benefit in deep snow, where St. Bernards iconically bring Cognac to avalanche victims. 
Alberch found this and other such functional hypotheses implausible. He proposed, 
instead, that limb bud size is again the relevant factor, and that large dogs, having large 
limb buds, will sometimes find themselves above a threshold limb bud size which results 
in the production of an additional digit, while poodles simply never approach that 
threshold (see Figure 4).
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Both examples illustrate a general methodology for demonstrating the need to 
foreground developmental processes in evolutionary models. What is not produced is  
evidence related to optimality – either evidence that a given feature is non-optimal or 
that some other structure would be optimal. What is produced is evidence that the 
feature under investigation (adult limb morphology) is a function of a developmental 
factor (limb bud size), and that the existing adult limb morphology can thus be 
interpreted as a side-effect of selection on body size alone (see Figure 5). Such causal 
claims can be supported by experimental data which demonstrate the relevant 
developmental relationships. Any additional explanations of the foot morphology by 
natural selection are not so much “disproved” as made redundant.
Alberch is clearly aware of the fact that he is interested in developmental causes not 
simply because they occur between genotype and phenotype (causal completeness), 
but because in this case they influence the direction of evolutionary transitions. In 
Alberch  (1985) he makes this explicit by arguing that some “intermediate causes” 
between genotype and phenotype are explanatorily relevant and therefore must be 
included in an adequate causal explanation, while others can be safely abstracted, 
since they add (in our terminology) only to causal completeness. Alberch writes:
Note that this discussion has not dealt with the genetic basis of the 
character. … It does not matter if the expression of the polydactylous 
morphology is controlled by an additive polygenic system […] or by a 
discrete Mendelian gene […]. The need to add a developmental 
component to the analysis is obvious, since a purely genetic study could 
not explain why mutations resulting in polydactyly appear only in large 
breeds and not in small ones. (p. 432)
We share Alberch’s view that molecular detail is unlikely to add to the explanatory power 
of this particular analysis, since a description purely at the supra-cellular level already 
supplies all the causal factors and regularities that we need to understand the 
evolutionary trajectory in question. An analysis of molecular mechanisms might reveal 
why it is the case that limb buds, depending on their size, give rise to different specific 
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morphologies. In other words, we would begin to understand why the relevant causal 
relationships between limb bud size and foot morphology themselves obtain (we would 
thus be decreasing vertical abstraction, or increasing mechanistic detail). Yet while this 
might be of interest to developmental biology proper, it is not at all clear how it would 
significantly deepen our insight into why evolution proceeded along the path that it did.
However, evo-devo is not necessarily more organismic than molecular. A second 
illustrative case, which exemplifies similar argument patterns, is from recent molecular 
work in Sean B. Carroll’s laboratory. It concerns the evolution of wing pigmentation 
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Figure 3. Experiments performed by Alberch and Gale (1985) to support a developmental explanation of 
differences in foot morphology between the salamander species Hemidactylium scutatum and 
Ambystoma mexicanum. Embroys were allowed to grow until their skeletal foot morphology could be 
determined by radiological techniques. H. scutatum and A. mexicanum developed clearly distinct 
morphologies when allowed to grow normally (panels A and B; note that A. mexicanum is the larger of 
the two species in terms of body size). When the size of the developing limb bud of A. mexicanum was 
reduced by treatment with the cellular toxin colchicine, which inhibits mitosis, A. mexicanum developed a 
skeletal morphology nearly identical to that of H. scutatum (panel C). The thereby established causal 
relationship supports the explanation of differences in limb morphologies as incidental consequences of 
differences in body size, rather than the cumulative product of natural selection acting on small heritable 
variations. (The differences in body size themselves may have been produced by selection, of course; 
see also Figure 5.)
patterns in Drosophila biarmipes  (Prud'homme et al 2007; Gompel et al 2005).4 
Prud’homme et al. show that wing spots originated through the creation of novel cis-
regulatory elements driving the expression (or repression) of the gene yellow. 
Importantly, the trans-acting factors that bind to this novel cis-regulatory sequence are 
expressed in the same pattern as in D. biarmipes in the wings of unspotted relatives, 
and were therefore, presumably, also expressed in this pattern in the wings of unspotted 
ancestors. Thus, the distribution of trans-regulatory factors observed in D. biarmipes 
(what Gompel et al. call the “regulatory landscape” of the wing) existed before wing 
spots actually evolved.
The study by Gompel et al. strongly suggests that the pre-existing regulatory landscape 
was co-opted for the production of wing spots once an appropriate (environmental or 
sexual) selective pressure existed. Thus, in order to understand wing spot morphology, 
we need to understand both selection and development. We need to know what 
conditions favored the evolution of some type of wing spots in some species of the 
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4 We thank Günter Wagner for suggesting this example.
Figure 4. Alberch’s hypothetical explanation of the fact that large dog breeds sometimes have additional 
digits, while small breeds do not. It is assumed that the number of digits produced is a function of the size 
of the developing limb bud, with digits being gained or lost above or below certain threshold sizes (T1 and 
T2). Only the size distributions of large breeds cross T2. If this causal relationship between body size 
(and indirectly limb size) and morphology can be demonstrated, then selectionist explanations of the 
appearance of additional digits in large breeds of dogs are redundant. This argument is identical to that 
presented for salamander foot morphology in Figure 5, but it is not backed up by experimental causal 
inferences as shown in Figure 3. Redrawn from Alberch (1985).
Drosophila genus, that is, we need to understand why such spots were advantageous. 
However, this will tell us little about the details of wing spot morphology, which appear 
not to have been minutely sculpted by selection for their functional role. In order to 
understand why the wing spots have their present, specific shape, we also need to 
understand something about the developmental machinery that was co-opted to 
produce them, that is, about the available distributions of trans-acting regulatory factors. 
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Figure 5. A schematic illustration of the argument by which the experiments presented in figure 3 
were taken to show the preferability of a developmental explanation to a selectionist interpretation. It 
would be difficult or impossible to demonstrate by experiment or modelling that differences in skeletal 
morphology cannot be due to natural selection acting under appropriate circumstances (the 
hypothetical causal pathway starting at A). However, it was possible to show by experiment that the 
size of the developing limb bud was an adequate causal explanation of the specifics of the skeletal 
morphology in the adult limb (the crucial part of the pathway starting at B). This positive 
demonstration of a causal relationship renders alternative, selectionist explanations superfluous.
While selection without a doubt pushed B. biarmipes toward the evolution of wing spots, 
it was the pre-existing developmental machinery that largely determined their specific 
morphology. 
Note that the logic of the argument in the study by Gompel et al. is the same as in the 
study by Alberch and Gale. The question of whether our explanation of the wing 
patterns under investigation should or should not include developmental constraints 
does not hinge on optimality models. The core argument is that purely developmental 
factors – in this case, the co-option of a pre-existing regulatory landscape – are 
sufficient to explain the specific morphology of the wing pigmentation. This claim can be 
demonstrated by causal inference, in this case molecular laboratory work. It is this 
demonstration of a causal relationship which renders the alternative, selectionist 
explanation (for the specific shape, not the existence of wing patterns per se) 
redundant. It demonstrates that, in this instance, an adequate explanation of 
evolutionary change needs to foreground developmental causes.
5. Conclusions
We have argued that two recent critiques of Mayr’s proximate-ultimate distinction – 
based on the notions of causal completeness and reciprocal causation – are 
unsatisfying. A more fruitful approach to the problem is to think about abstractions in 
complete causal models of evolutionary change: Depending on which parts of the 
complete causal model carry the most explanatory force, different processes will be 
foregrounded or backgrounded. 
This perspective allows us to charitably understand Mayr's dismissal of developmental 
causes as a statement about explanatory salience. Mayr assumed that selection acts on 
variation which is “isotropic” in Gould’s terminology: abundant, small and undirected. On 
this assumption, developmental processes carry little explanatory force in evolutionary 
transitions, and this – rather than the distinction between ultimate and proximate causes 
per se – motivated the claim that developmental processes were irrelevant to 
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evolutionary explanations. A half-century after Mayr’s original discussion, we can now 
recognize isotropy of variation as a special case which is violated in instances of 
developmental constraint or drive, or in cases of developmental plasticity.
A lean proximate-ultimate distinction – between biological mechanisms and evolutionary 
processes – should be maintained because proximate and ultimate causes answer 
different contrastive questions. It is entirely compatible with the view that developmental 
causes carry explanatory force in some evolutionary explanations: namely, when the 
assumption of isotropy of variation is not met.
To connect our views with biological practice, we have shown that understanding these 
issues in terms of abstraction in scientific models illuminates important methodological 
points. Pere Alberch’s paradigmatic studies of developmental constraints in the 1980s 
distinguish between causal completeness and explanatory salience, and they can be 
understood as foregrounding the explanatory role of developmental factors in particular 
evolutionary transitions. Moreover, more recent molecular studies in evo-devo can be 
shown to employ similar argument patterns. The usual assumption that developmental 
constraints or drive must be investigated by way of optimality analyses is thus mistaken: 
The foregrounding of developmental processes is possible with the laboratory resources 
familiar to developmental biologists.
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